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1) The Claims of Adverbialism
Adverbialist theories of attention start from a claim that might seem tautological: that a
creature is paying attention if, and only if, it is doing something attentively (Mole, 2011, Ch. 2).
While this might seem undeniable, taking it as our starting point subverts psychology’s usual
explanatory practices.
Those practices approach the explanation of attention by attempting to identify some process
that takes place in all and only the cases where someone is attentive, or, if no one such process
can be found, by identifying some family of attention processes, perhaps via the identification
of the neural circuitry, mechanism, or network that implements them (see Maunsell, 2015, for a
progress report on attempts to implement this approach).
Psychologists adopting this approach have often assumed that it must be practicable if attention
is to be in good scientific standing: When the approach proves ineffective – whether because
quite different processes are involved in different contexts where attention is paid, or because
the neural circuitry that is involved in attention seems also to be involved in various other things
– this is taken to indicate that the concept of attention is in some way defective (van der
Heijden & Bem, 1997; Parasuraman, 1998; Di Lollo, 2018). Some theorists go so far as to
1 The authors contributed equally to the preparation of this article, and the order in which their names appear here
is arbitrary.
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suggest that, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as attention (Anderson, 2011; 2021;
Hommel et al, 2019).
The adverbialist rejects such impugnments by showing how the concept of attention can refer
to a real phenomenon – with unimpeachable naturalistic credentials and an important
explanatory role – even if there is no one process, nor any family of processes, that it denotes.
When we fail to find such processes adverbialism claims that the fault lies, not with the concept
of attention, but with psychology’s process-identifying approach to its explanation.
Rather than attempting to identify a process of attention, the adverbialist proposes that
attention should be explained by identifying a manner of occurrence that can be instantiated by
quite various processes, and that might therefore have no distinctive neural signature.
This treats the question “What is attention?” as if it were similar to the question “What is
haste?”, or “What is practice?” (Mole, 2011, following White, 1964). There is no one process
that takes place in all and only the cases where someone is being hasty: a hasty person might be
performing hasty arithmetic; or hasty proof-reading, or the hasty sewing-on of a button. We
cannot tell which processes are taking place, either at the personal or the subpersonal level, if
we know only that haste was instantiated. Nor is there any implication running in the opposite
direction: we cannot tell whether haste was instantiated if we know only that a button was
sewn on, or that arithmetic was performed, whether these processes are identified in personal
terms or neurological ones. This is because facts about haste are not facts about which
processes are taking place, nor about some broad family of processes any one of which might
be taking place. They are about the way in which processes occur, whatever processes those
happen to be.
‘Practice’ and ‘haste’ are not defective concepts. They denote real phenomena, the explanation
of which proceeds adverbially, rather than via the identification of the processes constituting
them. These phenomena are not disqualified from doing explanatory work of their own. A
person’s practice or haste might explain various features of their current and future behaviour,
without those explanations telling us which processes they, or their brains, instantiate. So it is,
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the adverbialist says, for attention: the fact that someone is paying attention plays an
indispensable role in explaining the efficacy, persistence, speed, and accuracy of that person’s
behavioural and cognitive performances, while telling us little about which processes might be
taking place at the personal or at the neuronal level. Rather, it tells us about the manner in
which some of those processes occur.
2) The Explanatory Import of Adverbialism for Contemporary Attention Research
Because adverbialism denies that instances of attention must involve any particular process, it
tells us that we should not look for any circuit, mechanism, or network in the brain that
implements this process. More generally, it suggests that we should not expect the instances of
attention to share the properties that they inherit directly from the processes which implement
those instances: just as instances of hasty arithmetic have a timescale that is quite different
from the timescale of hasty sewing, so the instances of attentive colour discrimination may have
a timescale that is quite different from the timescale of attentive visual search, or of attentive
action. Adverbialism therefore offers a distinctively metaphysical diagnosis of why it is that
certain questions about attention have proven to be empirically recalcitrant (for a recent
example, see Mole, 2020), but this is not because the adverbialist rejects psychology’s research
methods. It contests the standard construal of the facts that those methods reveal, but also
gives a positive specification of the metaphysical position that is implicit within one prominent
branch of recent psychological theorizing. By making that position explicit, adverbialism gives
its own positive account of the way in which this theorizing accomplishes its explanatory work,
thereby enabling some persistent confusions to be identified and avoided.
That positive account can be seen, together with the confusions that it identifies, by considering
adverbialism’s perspective on the biased competition theory of attention (Desimone & Duncan,
1995; Duncan, 1996; Scolari & Awl, 2019). This theory takes attention to arise from competitive
interactions within and between different levels of the brain’s processing hierarchy. In its
original formulation, the theory suggested that these competitions could be biased by signals
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originating from any number of other competitions. Competitions between visual stimuli could
be biased by other competitive processes taking place in the visual cortex, and competitions
between higher-level representations could be biased by other competitive processes taking
place in the more cognitive parts of the cortex, but in neither case were these local influences
taken to be the only ones at work. Instead the theory supposed that the outcome of any
competition could exert an influence, more or less directly, on any number of others, from the
bottom up or from the top down, so that: “Competition, finally, is integrated between
components of the sensorimotor network … As an object gains dominance in any one system,
responses to this same object are supported elsewhere.” (Duncan, 1998, p. 1308, emphasis
added).
A psychologist who was wedded to the process-identifying mode of explanation might try to see
the biased competition theory as conforming to it, by saying that the theory does identify a
specific process from which attention always arises: the process of competition-biasing. This
construal of the theory faces a difficulty: it conflates the theory’s claims about attention with its
claims about attention’s causal antecedents. If attention were to be identified with the process
by which competitions are biased (as the process-based construal alleges), then attention would
be identical to that process whereby other stimuli make unsuccessful attempts to suppress the
attended stimulus. This process of unsuccessful suppression by unattended stimuli occurs,
according to the biased-competition theory, whenever attention is paid to a stimulus. Indeed,
some suppression is said to be taking place whenever multiple stimuli are in view. However, it is
not the presence of this process that explains the distinctive way in which attended stimuli are
processed. To explain that the theory must appeal to the dominant manner in which attended
stimuli are processed when the biased competition is being won. Whereas the biasing process
explains why it is that some of the processes taking place in the brain instantiate competitive
dominance over others, it is that property of dominance that gives the theory its account of
what attention is. But knowing that a process is dominant does not tell us which process it is. It
tells us about the way in which that process happens. And so the biased competition theory is,
on this construal, a version of adverbialism.
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Insisting on this interpretation of the theory might strike some readers as mere pedantry, but it
enables us to avoid some confusions concerning the questions which the theory’s advocates
need to address. It is often supposed that the theory faces a particularly difficult question
about the origin of the biasing signals that it postulates. This is taken to be an embarrassment
for the theory, because one might think that attention itself must have the role of selecting the
stimuli in favour of which competitions will be biased. One might therefore think that, without
an account of these biasing signals’ origin, the theory stops short of explaining attention itself,
instead telling us only about the mechanism through which its influence is mediated. On the
adverbialist construal, this objection has no force. The answer to the question of where the
biasing signals come from is, according to the adverbialists’ construal of the biased competition
theory, that they can come from anywhere. Attention is not identified by enumerating the
sources of those signals, but by identifying the characteristic manner in which processing that is
subject to such influences takes place.
Despite claiming that the resolution of any competition can potentially contribute a source of
bias to any other competition in the processing hierarchy, the adverbialist construal of the
biased competition theory is consistent with holding that certain sources of bias will be
especially influential in particular contexts. For example, Duncan and colleagues acknowledge
the special importance of a pair of overlapping networks in the frontal and parietal brain
regions, the activation of which is related to the maintenance in working memory of the
subject’s task set. Rather than interpreting these brain regions as a specialized attentional
circuit, as some researchers operating within the biased competition framework have done
(e.g., Kastner, 2009), Duncan and colleagues interpret them as one notable source of bias within
a thoroughly distributed competitive interaction. In doing so, they interpret the role of these
source regions in agreement with the adverbialist’s thesis that attentiveness emerges when
certain stimuli or ideas come to dominate in a competition in which various processes
participate.
It is not only in connection with the biased competition theory that adverbialism rejects certain
questions that would otherwise seem to be pressing. Something similar can be seen in
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connection with debates about the relation of attention to working memory. There is good
evidence that the maintenance of information in working memory can influence one’s
performance of tasks requiring attention to stimuli that are perceived in one’s immediate
environment (Oh & Kim, 2004; Woodman & Luck, 2004). Since the brain regions activated in
these tasks overlap substantially with the regions that are activated during working memory
tasks (Mayer et al, 2007; Tsubomi et al, 2013), the interference between them has suggested to
some researchers that a single limited-capacity process explains the limitations of working
memory and also the limitations on the division of our attention (e.g., Cowan, 2001). There are,
however, ways in which the influence of visual attention on visual working memory looks unlike
a case in which two processes are competing for a single processing-resource. Notably, not all
tasks requiring the subject to maintain information in working memory appear to interfere with
tasks requiring that she direct her attention elsewhere (Fougnie & Marois, 2006; Rerko, Souza,
& Oberauer, 2014; Souza & Oberauer, 2017). It is a matter of controversy how to reconcile this
seemingly contradictory pattern of findings.
Olivers and Roelfsema (2020) have recently advanced a framework that promises to account for
the specific conditions under which attention and working memory tasks interfere. They argue
that we can account for these disparate findings by claiming that attention is required, not to
maintain information in visual working memory, but only to use this information to act, whether
overtly or covertly. In doing so, Olivers and Roelfsema argue that attention is ‘selection for
action’ (Allport, 1987; Neumann, 1987). As we argue below, this thesis, appropriately
interpreted, is consistent with adverbialism. However, from the adverbialist’s perspective,
Olivers and Roelfsema make a tactical mistake when they claim to “avoid some definitional
conundrums”, “by linking attention to clearly defined and neurophysiologically plausible
mechanisms” (Olivers & Roelfsema, 2020, p. 180). This is a mistake, in part, because avoiding
the ‘definitional conundrums’ to which they refer does not require identifying specific neural
mechanisms to implement attention. To avoid those conundrums, it is sufficient to give some
non-circular specification of the manner in which particular processes occur when and only
when subjects attend. Olivers and Roelfsema do just this when they propose to understand
attention as the “emergent property of sensory-action coupling” (ibid. p. 181), and to explain
6
the distinctive performance benefit associated with recently attended sensory information in
terms of attention’s causal contribution to reinforcement learning (or “credit assignment”) (ibid.
p. 182-3). In light of these features of their account, their attempt to identify attention with a
particular neurophysiological process seems unmotivated. It is also, according to the
adverbialist, ill-advised. The attentiveness of the subject who pays attention to a perceptual
task may be explained by the manner of occurrence of processes that enable this subject to
perform that task, just as the attentiveness of one who is paying attention to a memory task
may be explained by the manner of occurrence of the processes that enable him to perform
that. These two sets of processes may sometimes intersect, in ways that cause these tasks to
interfere with one another, without any of the neurophysiological mechanisms implementing
those processes having any particular link to attention. (Compare the fact that hasty mental
arithmetic might sometimes interfere with hasty visual search: a fact that is not to be explained
by identifying haste with any subset of the arithmetic-implementing mechanisms.)
3) Some Adverbialist Theories
The biased competition theory tells us that a subject’s perception of (or thinking about) a
stimulus is attentive if and only if that stimulus is dominant in a biased competition. Other
theories that take an adverbialist approach give a somewhat different account of the attentive
manner, but some themes are common to many of these theories. The theory developed in
Mole (2011) has (by design) much in common with the biased competition approach. According
to Mole, the fact that someone is paying attention is a fact about the absence of distractions
that might occupy the cognitive resources that this person could bring to bear in doing
whatever it is that they happen to be doing. This theory treats attention as if it were analogous
to unison, saying that attention has no seat in the brain just as unison has no seat in the
orchestra, and adding that, just as arbitrarily different melodies can be performed in unison, so
arbitrarily different tasks can be performed attentively. It implies that the cognitive processes
implementing attention in one context might take place in another context where no attention
was paid, just as any one of the instruments that contributes to an instance of orchestral unison
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might also have been playing (and playing the very same thing) on an occasion where the
orchestra was not instantiating unison.
The unison theory has been criticized on the grounds that it sets too high a bar on attention,
counting most cases of attentiveness as merely partial attention. A related complaint is that it
allows attention to be divided only in a rather circumscribed range of cases, so that two tasks
can simultaneously receive full attention only if there is no overlap in the sets of cognitive
resources that could serve them (unless the resources that fall in this overlap can somehow
make an equal contribution to both tasks by doing some one thing, see Mole, 2011, §4.12).
Partly in order to avoid these difficulties, Philipp Koralus has proposed that attentive task
performance should be modelled as determining a question that is used to monitor the
subject’s progress in completing that task (Koralus, 2014). Other adverbialist theories offer
different analyses of what it is for something to be done attentively. They have tended to share
a commitment to the idea that attentive subjects are never merely passive recipients of
perceptual information. Attentiveness is exhibited by activities in which the attentive subject is
involved as an agent, perhaps because they are actively enquiring into where things are, or
what they are, or perhaps because they are involved in some business that manifests itself
more immediately in their outward behaviour.
4) Selection for Action
Their emphasis on the activity of the attentive perceiver creates a natural affinity between
these versions of adverbialism and the theories that have identified attention with ‘selection for
action’. Like Koralus’s erotetic theory, the selection-for-action theories depict attentive subjects
as putting their perceptual states to active use in the service of answering a question (Allport,
1987, Neumann, 1987, Castiello, 1996). On the erotetic theory, the question that the attentive
subject brings to perception is concerned with how matters stand in the world (including
whether the goal of this subject’s task has yet been achieved). On the selection-for-action
theory the question is more immediately practical: it is distinctive of the attentive perceiver that
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they use information from perception in determining the manner in which they will move – e.g.,
in resolving such fine-grained questions of implementation as how to prehend one’s hand when
reaching for a cup.
The erotetic and unison theories have been explicitly formulated under the adverbialist banner,
but inclusion of the selection-for-action theory within the adverbialist framework depends on
how one develops that theory. In particular, care is required in specifying the agential role that
is attributed to attention on the theory (Henry 2019), and it is useful to distinguish two versions
of it.
According to the first version, which is found in the work of Wayne Wu (2011; 2014), the paying
of attention consists in the selection of one out of many alternative behavioural possibilities:
attentional selection occurs when and only when an agent acts, and an agent acts when and
only when the agent traverses ‘behavioural space’ – a space consisting in the set of alternate
behavioural possibilities that are open to the agent at a time, given the many possible targets of
response and the many ways in which the agent can possibly respond to each target. This takes
the paying of attention to consist in the selection of one of many possible target-response
pairings – a selection that constitutes the agent’s traversing of behavioural space and thus, Wu
claims, their acting rather than responding reflexively and passively. This view takes attention
to be necessary for action because agents always have the option of behaving differently.
The second version of the theory, which Henry (2019) defends, develops the claim that
attention is selection for action within the context of an understanding of action as an ongoing
process in which agents continually guide their behaviour in light of their goals or priorities (cf.
Frankfurt 1978). On this version, attention endows its possessor with the capacity to coherently
and flexibly navigate an informationally rich environment by compensating for the interference
that would otherwise result from the processing of distracting stimuli and information. As
Henry notes, such an ability to adjust for the deleterious effects of distractors during action, and
so to prioritize what is currently most relevant, is one that an agent must possess whether or
not it was possible for them to attend and act otherwise than they do in a given circumstance,
pace Wu. For example, it is at least questionable whether more automatic deployments of
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attention, including those that, on some views, are essential to the guidance of skilled
performances, are such that the agent was in fact capable of directing her attention differently
than she in fact did.
These two interpretations of the agentive role of attention on the selection-for-action theory
suggest different assessments of adverbialism. Wu’s version of the theory plausibly entails a
conception of attentional selection as the exercise of a causal power – namely, the power to
take one behavioural path rather than another one. This places the agent’s ‘selection’ in the
metaphysical category of an occurrence – e.g., an event, process, or activity – rather than, as
adverbialists maintain, a manner of occurrence. Henry’s version lacks this consequence. On
that version it is possible (and perhaps preferable) to understand attention, not as an event or
process of selection (e.g., as that which causes the removal of distractor interference within the
cognitive basis of the agent’s task performance), but as the resultant selectiveness with which
agents guide their conduct, and so do whatever it is they do. On this version of the view,
attention is a property of an agent’s unfolding cognitive and motor activities (i.e., of their
manner), rather than a distinct cognitive process or activity alongside others.
5) Distraction and Attention
Following a suggestion in the work of William James, adverbialists have tended to understand
attention as contrary to distraction (James, 1890/1950). On the unison view, for example, just
as an orchestra’s unison consists in the absence of any members playing different melodies, so
the subject’s state of attention consists in the absence of task-irrelevant processing in the
cognitive resources that could serve her performance. This leads to an objection (raised by
Watzl, 2011, and Levy, 2017). Instead of taking distraction to be incompatible with attention,
one might instead take it to be attention of one particular misdirected sort. A theory of
attention that does not apply to cases of distraction would then be extensionally inadequate.
It may be possible for the adverbialist to meet this challenge by giving a more nuanced account
of the sense in which attention and distraction are opposed, and thereby showing how their
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theory can cast some explanatory light on distraction, while still maintaining that the distracted
person is not attentive. This account might take distraction to stand in a relation to attention
that is similar to the relation of counterfeit money to true currency: for something to be
counterfeit money, it must be capable of engaging in money-like interactions, while nonetheless
being something other than the real thing, and therefore falling outside the scope of a theory
that attempts to tell us what money is. The adverbialist might say that cases of distraction fall
outside the proper scope of their theory, while showing a similarly essential tendency to have
an attention-like role in the mental economy. Considerable work would be needed to turn this
suggestive simile into something more theoretically satisfactory.
A more thoroughly worked-out account of the opposition between attention and distraction can
be found in Henry (2019). Henry accepts the characterization of distraction as a genuine
instance of attention, while also accepting the adverbialist’s characterization of attention as
fundamentally opposed to distraction. To render these claims consistent, he interprets the
opposition between attention and distraction, not as a relation of metaphysical incompatibility,
but as a consequence of attention’s constitutive aim. To grasp this proposal, it is useful to
consider some examples of other cognitive phenomena that possess a constitutive aim, and
that therefore admit of a distinction between successful and defective instances. For example, it
is widely agreed that a false belief is a defective mental state insofar as it fails to achieve the
constitutive aim or role proper to belief – namely, truth or knowledge (Williams 1974; Velleman
2000). Henry suggests, similarly, that instances of distracted attention are defective because
they fail to achieve the constitutive aim of attention: the elimination of distraction, or (what one
might take to be equivalent) the ‘prioritizing’ of what is currently most relevant to the agent in
light of her goals or priorities. In cases of distracted attention, how the agent attends is
incongruent with what is relevant to her in the circumstances. Accordingly, the constitutive aim
of attention is not fulfilled, and the subject attends imperfectly. When we combine this view of
distracted attention with the adverbialist’s thesis that attention is a manner of acting, we arrive
at the claim that distracted attention is an imperfect manner of acting. This coheres with the
observation that states of distracted attention manifest overtly in imperfect task performances
– e.g., in mistakes like pressing the wrong key, or attempting to grasp with the wrong grip-size.
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On this account, it is true both that the subject’s suboptimal performance is attentive (to the
degree that it is selective), and that its defects are defects of attention. This suggests one way
that states of attention stand opposed to states of distraction, without the combination of
attention and distraction therefore being impossible.
The correct handling of attention’s relation to distraction is just one of the conceptual issues
that adverbialists will need to address before their account of attention is complete. Even while
some of those issues remain open, adverbialism offers a viable account of the sort of thing that
attention is, and gives a distinctive theory of the way in which attention relates to the processes
that take place in the brain of the attentive subject.
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